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There is no official definition of rule of law backsliding although the expression can be
found in official literature. In light of the pattern of constitutional capture (an expression
coined by Professor Müller) which has materialised in what seems to be an increasing
number of countries in the past decade or so, we recently proposed to define rule of law
backsliding in this article as “the process through which elected public authorities
deliberately implement governmental blueprints which aim to systematically weaken,
annihilate or capture internal checks on power with the view of dismantling the liberal
democratic state and entrenching the long-term rule of the dominant party”.
The notion of backsliding implies that a country was once better, and then regressed. A key
feature of this process of weakening checks and balances is that it reflects a deliberate
strategy of a ruling party, the (unadvertised) goal being to establish electoral autocracies
(with elections possibly “free” but no longer “fair”) and the progressive solidification of de
facto one-party states.
Would-be-autocrats invariably target what one may call democratic rules and institutions
more broadly and therefore “rule of law backsliding” may also be possibly labelled
“democratic backsliding”, which is the expression used for instance by International IDEA in
its 2017 Global State of Democracy. The bottom line however remains the same: “Modern
backsliding can take place though the manipulation of democratic rules and institutions.
Constitutions and electoral rules can be used to favour a ruling party and limit the
independence and power of the judiciary and the media”.
To speak of “illiberal democracy” in this context is deeply misguided and unhelpful as it
“provides a sense of philosophical sophistication to something that is better described as a
power grab”. In a recent article of ours, we spoke of a recipe or blueprint for constitutional
capture which follows a well-organised script that we summarised as follows:
i) Rule of law backsliding tends to begin with a significant number of citizens losing faith in
their system of government for reasons which vary from increasing inequality, persistent
unemployment or the predatory practices of the ruling elites. This is often accompanied by a
crisis in the party system in which at least one of the mainstream parties is either riven with
conflict or takes a sharp turn to an extreme which then presents itself as a normal option at
the next election;
ii) Disgruntled citizens vote to break the system by electing a leader who promises radical
change, often referring to the “will of the people” while attacking the pre-existing
constitutional framework with cleverly crafted legalistic blueprints borrowed from other
‘successful’ autocrats;
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iii) The new autocrats act quickly to disable or take over the key offices that might resist
their consolidation of power, which includes the independent judiciary, the media and the
repressive institutions (security services, police, public prosecutor’s office);
iv) To remain popular, these autocrats engage in benefit giveaways while they seek to
control the public debate and eliminate alternative views through the bullying of civil society
groups and the deployment of newly captured tax police and public prosecutors against
their opponents;
v) They then change the election law, the electorate (by pushing the opposition out of the
country or suppressing their votes) or both;
vi) When voters eventually wake up to the damage done (usually too late, as the new
autocrat has by that time destroyed any channel through which alternative views may be
expressed), they have few options to resist because their constitutional system has been
captured and no constitutional avenue remains to effectively challenge the
government/ruling party;
vii) In the unlikely situation where resistance nonetheless emerges from the Parliament or
from the streets, biased referenda can always be organised to confirm the will of the leader
under the guise of the will of ‘the people’, a notion which authoritarian populists find useful
to rely upon in order to put themselves “above democratic institutions and to overcome
obstacles” which may stand in their way;
viii) Having sealed the space against dissenting voices and rewritten electoral regulations,
autocrats can then expect to get the votes they need to win subsequent elections by
whipping up imaginary enemies or giving away state largesse to garner votes. In this way,
the rotation of power from one party to another becomes a feature of the past.
Faced with “the systematic disabling of checks and balances in constitutional orders by a
new generation of elected but autocratic leaders”, EU institutions have struggled to cope
with this new and unexpected challenge as the assumption has long been that pre-
accession checks would guarantee that no country would be admitted to the EU club
unless it had already reached the stage of a sustainable democratic regime based on the
rule of law, an accomplishment that appeared to preclude backsliding.
Numerous factors explain the relatively late realisation by EU institutions of the problem it
was facing, one of which is the new autocrats’ practice of scanning “the horizon for the
worst practices from good states and adopt[ing] them. Because the practices are from good
states, autocrats can claim double standards if they are criticized”.
In addition to being in denial about the nature and gravity of the problem, a number of key
actors have also been willing to countenance a number of far-fetched legal arguments
which have been raised by “autocratic legalists” to borrow the expression coined by
Professor Scheppele. These arguments will be dealt in our Question 4 and Question 5.
First, however, we will explain in our next Q&A why the EU should be concerned when
there is constitutional capture going on inside an EU Member State.
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